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No-go theorems for ψ-epistemic models based on a continuity assumption
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The quantum state ψ is a mathematical object used to determine the probabilities of different
outcomes when measuring a physical system. Its fundamental nature has been the subject of
discussions since the inception of quantum theory: is it ontic, that is, does it correspond to a real
property of the physical system? Or is it epistemic, that is, does it merely represent our knowledge
about the system? Assuming a natural continuity assumption and a weak separability assumption,
we show here that epistemic interpretations of the quantum state are in contradiction with quantum
theory. Our argument is different from the recent proof of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph and it already
yields a non-trivial constraint on ψ-epistemic models using a single copy of the system in question.
Introduction. Quantum theory textbooks usually start
from the hypothesis that to every physical system corre-
sponds a mathematical object – a ray in Hilbert space –
called the quantum state. They then go on to deduce the
multitude of quantitative predictions that make quantum
theory so successful. But does the quantum state corre-
spond to a real physical state or does it merely represent
an observer’s knowledge about the underlying reality?
A major reason for doubting the reality of the quantum
state is that it cannot be observed directly: it can only be
reconstructed indirectly by lengthy state estimation pro-
cedures [1, 2]. Furthermore, an epistemic interpretation
of the quantum state could provide an intuitive explana-
tion for many counterintuitive quantum phenomena and
paradoxes, such as the measurement postulate and wave-
function collapse [3–5].
To formulate with precision the above question, we as-
sume, following [6], that every quantum system possesses
a real physical state (also called ontic state), denoted λ,
which is independent of the observer. When a measure-
ment is performed on the system, the probabilities to get
different outcomes are determined by λ. If an ensem-
ble of such systems is prepared, different members of the
ensemble may be found in different states λ. A prepa-
ration procedure Q therefore corresponds in general to
a probability distribution P (λ|Q) over the real states.
The probability to obtain the outcome r when prepara-
tion Q is followed by measurement M is P (r|M,Q) =∑
λ P (r|M,λ)P (λ|Q). Such a model will reproduce the
quantum predictions if P (r|M,Q) = 〈ψQ|Mr|ψQ〉, where
ψQ is the quantum state assigned by quantum theory to
the preparation Q and Mr is the quantum operator de-
scribing the measurement.
We can now distinguish two classes of models of the
above type. A model is said to be ψ-ontic if the prepa-
ration of distinct pure quantum states always give rise to
distinct real states. That is, for every λ either P (λ|Q) =
0 or P (λ|Q′) = 0 if the preparations Q and Q′ corre-
spond to different quantum states |ψQ〉 6= |ψQ′〉. In this
case, every real state λ is compatible with a unique pure
quantum state. The quantum state is “encoded” in λ and
we can consider it to represent a real property of the sys-
tem, akin, e.g., to the total energy of a system in classical
physics [7]. In the second class of models, known as ψ-
epistemic models, preparation of distinct pure quantum
states may result in the same real state λ. Formally, there
exists preparations Q and Q′ corresponding to distinct
quantum states |ψQ〉 6= |ψQ′〉 such that both P (λ|Q) > 0
and P (λ|Q′) > 0 for some λ. In this case, the quantum
state is not uniquely determined by the underlying real
state and has a status analogous, e.g., to the Liouville
distribution in statistical physics.
While non-trivial ψ-epistemic models exist in any fixed
dimension d [8, 13], such models are necessarily highly
contrived. Indeed, Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR)
have recently shown that the predictions of ψ-epistemic
models are in contradiction with quantum theory under
the assumption, termed preparation independence, that
independently prepared pure quantum states correspond
to product distributions over ontic states [9]. In the
present work, we derive two alternative no-go theorems
for ψ-epistemic models based on a natural assumption
of continuity. Our approach shows that already at the
level of a single system there exist strong constraints on
ψ-epistemic models. Furthermore, our first no-go theo-
rem readily translates in a simple experimental test, an
implementation of which has been reported in [10] us-
ing high-dimensional attenuated coherent states of light
traveling in an optical fibre.
Constraints on ψ-epistemic models at the level of single
quantum systems have also been obtained in [14] using
an assumption termed ontic indifference. This assump-
tion is in fact closely related to the one presented here. In
Section 2 of the Supplemental Material [15], we show how
to use our approach to recover, in a simple and clear way,
those of [14]. Arguments using single quantum systems
have also been used in [11, 12] to show that ψ-epistemic
model cannot be “maximally epistemic” (in a sense de-
fined in [11, 12].
No-go theorems for ψ-epistemic models. The key mo-
tivation behind our result is that ψ-epistemic models
should satisfy a form of continuity. Indeed, we assign an
ontic status to ψ if a variation of ψ necessarily implies a
variation of the underlying reality λ, and we assign it an
epistemic status if a variation of ψ does not necessarily
imply a variation of λ. It is then natural to assume a form
of continuity for ψ-epistemic models: a slight change of
ψ induces a slight change in the corresponding ensemble
2FIG. 1. Illustration of ψ-ontic and δ-continuous ψ-epistemic
models. Depicted is the space Λ of ontic states, as well as the
support of the probability distribution P (λ|Qk) for prepara-
tion Qk associated to distinct pure states ψk, k = 1, . . . , 5. In
ψ-ontic models (left) distinct quantum states give rise to prob-
ability distribution P (λ|Qk) with no overlap. In δ-continuous
ψ-epistemic models (right), states that are close to each other
(such as {ψ1, ψ2, ψ3} and {ψ3, ψ4, ψ5}) all share common on-
tic states. However states that are further from each other
(such as ψ1 and {ψ4, ψ5}) do not necessarily have common
ontic states λ.
of λ’s in such a way that at least some λ’s from the initial
ensemble will also belong to the perturbed ensemble. We
use a slightly stronger form of continuity which asserts
that there are real states λ in the initial ensemble that
will remain part of the perturbed ensemble, no matter
how we perturb the initial state, provided this perturba-
tion is small enough. Models that violate this condition
are presumably very contrived. Formally this continuity
condition is defined as follows (see Fig. 1 for a depic-
tion of the difference between ψ-ontic and δ-continuous
ψ-epistemic models).
Definition (δ-continuity). Let δ > 0 and let Bδψ be the
ball of radius δ centered on |ψ〉, i.e., Bδψ is the set of states
|φ〉 such that |〈φ|ψ〉| ≥ 1 − δ. We say that a model is δ-
continuous if for any preparation Q, there exists an ontic
state λ (which can depend on Q) such that for all prepara-
tions Q′ corresponding to quantum states |φQ′ 〉 in the ball
BδψQ centered on the state |ψQ〉, we have P (λ|Q′) > 0.
Note that for notational simplicity we formulate our
results in the case where the set Λ = {λ} of real states is
finite or denumerable. The generalisation of Theorems 1
and 2 below to measurable spaces is given in Section 1
of the Supplemental Material [15]. This generalisation
is important since reproducing the predictions of even a
single qubit requires an infinite, and probably even un-
countably infinite, number of real states, see [18–20] for
evidence to this effect.
Note also that the above definition introduces a con-
nection between the overlap of quantum states and the
overlap of distributions in the ontic space of λs. This is
extremely natural if we do not introduce a privileged di-
rection in Hilbert space (i,e, a preferred basis), since then
the properties of psi-epistemic models can only depend
on the geometry of the Hilbert space.
Our first result is a constraint on δ-continuous models
for single systems.
Theorem 1. There are no δ-continuous models with δ ≥
1−
√
(d− 1)/d reproducing the measurement statistics of
quantum states in a Hilbert space of dimension d.
Proof. Consider d preparations Qk (k = 1, . . . , d) corre-
sponding to distinct quantum states |ψk〉 all contained in
a ball of radius δ. By definition of a δ-continuous model,
there is at least one λ for which mink P (λ|Qk) > 0 and
thus
ǫ ≡
∑
λ
min
k
P (λ|Qk) > 0 . (1)
This last quantity can be viewed as a measure of the
extent to which distributions over real states overlap in
the neighborhood of a given quantum state. It was also
introduced in [9] where it was shown to be related to the
variational distance between the distributions P (λ|Qk).
Suppose now that a measurement M yielding one of
the possible outcomes r = 1, . . . , d is made on each of
the prepared systems. A δ-continuous model then makes
the prediction∑
k
P (k|M,Qk) =
∑
k
∑
λ
P (k|M,λ)P (λ|Qk)
≥
∑
k
∑
λ
P (k|M,λ)min
k
P (λ|Qk)
=
∑
λ
min
k
P (λ|Qk) = ǫ > 0 . (2)
According to quantum theory, however, there exist states
in a Hilbert space of dimension d contained in a ball of
radius δ = 1 −
√
(d− 1)/d such that the left-hand side
of Eq. (2) is equal to 0. To show this, let {|j〉 : j =
1, . . . , d} be a basis of the Hilbert space. Consider the d
distinct states |ψk〉 = 1√d−1
∑
j 6=k |j〉. These states are
all at mutual distance |〈ψk|ψ〉| =
√
(d− 1)/d from the
state |ψ〉 = 1√
d
∑
j |j〉. Let the measurement M be the
measurement in the basis {|j〉}. Then P (k|M,Qk) = 0
for all k = 1, . . . , d and thus
∑
k P (k|M,Qk) = 0. (These
states and measurements were considered in the d = 3
case in [16]).
Note that the above result also applies if we only re-
quire δ-continuity to hold around some fixed quantum
states rather than for all states in Hilbert space. Inter-
estingly, the ψ-epistemic model of [8] for Hilbert spaces of
dimension d is δ-continuous around a specific state with
a value of δ saturating the above bound.
Though one expects a ψ-epistemic model to be δ-
continuous for some value of δ, the bound derived in
Theorem 1 may a priori seem arbitrary. This motivates
the following definition.
3Definition (Continuity). A ψ-epistemic model is con-
tinuous if there exists a non-zero δ > 0 such that it is
δ-continuous.
Our second result shows that there are no ψ-epistemic
models that are both continuous and which satisfy the
following separability assumption. A similar condition
was independently introduced in [17], where it is called
“compactness”. Though weaker than the preparation in-
dependence assumption explicitly used by PBR, it is al-
ready sufficient to derive their main result.
Definition (Separability). Let Q be the preparation
of a physical system yielding with non-zero probability
P (λ|Q) > 0 the real state λ. A model is separable if
n independent copies Qn = (Q, . . . , Q) of the preparation
devices yield with non-zero probability P (~λ = λn|Qn) > 0
a system in the joint real state λn = (λ, . . . , λ), for any
positive integer n.
Theorem 2. Separable continuous ψ-epistemic models
cannot reproduce the measurement statistics of quantum
states in a Hilbert space of dimension d ≥ 3.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to fix an arbitrarily small
δ > 0, and choose specific states |φk〉, all within the ball
of radius δ. Because of δ-continuity, these states share
a common ontic state. Using separability, the states
|φ⊗nk 〉 also share a common ontic state. By taking n
large enough, the distance between the tensor products
|φ⊗nk 〉 becomes large enough that we can apply Theorem
1. More in detail we proceed as follows.
Consider d ≥ 3 preparations Qk corresponding to
the d distinct states |φk〉 = α|k〉 + β/
√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉 with
k = 1, . . . , d, α = −
√
1− [(d− 2)/(d− 1)]1/n and
β = −α/
√
d +
√
α2/d+ [(d− 2)/(d− 1)]1/n. It is eas-
ily checked that these states are normalised 〈φk|φk〉 = 1,
have mutual scalar product |〈φk|φl〉| = [(d−2)/(d−1)]1/n
for k 6= l, and are all at distance |〈φk|φ〉| = 1 − δnd
from the state |φ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉, where δnd = 1 −√
1− (d− 1)α2/d. In a δnd-continuous model, these
states share at least a common real state λ. The sep-
arability assumption then implies that the states |φ⊗nk 〉
also share a common real state, and thus that ǫn ≡∑
λmink P (λ|Qnk ) > 0 . By the same argument as
in Theorem 1, it then follows that if a measurement
M yielding one of the possible outcomes r = 1, . . . , d
is performed on each of these systems, the quantity∑
k P (k|M,Qnk ) ≥ ǫn > 0.
Note now that the d n-fold copies |φ⊗nk 〉 are nor-
malised and have mutual scalar product |〈φ⊗nk |φ⊗nl 〉| =
(d−2)/(d−1) for k 6= l. There therefore exists a unitary
transformation U in the subspace Sd ⊂ C⊗nd spanned by
the d states |φ⊗nk 〉 that carries out the transformation:
U |φ⊗nk 〉 = |ψk〉 where |ψk〉 = 1√d−1 (
∑d
j=1 |j〉 − |k〉) for
some basis {|j〉}. The states |ψk〉 are identical to the
states used in the proof of Theorem 1. It follows that
there exists a d-outcome measurement M in C⊗nd which
applied on the states |φ⊗nk 〉 gives the same statistics as
the measurement in the basis {|j〉} applied on the states
|ψk〉 of Theorem 1. We can therefore find a measurement
such that P (k|M,Qnk ) = 0 and thus
∑
k P (k|M,Qnk ) = 0
in contradiction with the prediction of a δnd-continuous
separable ψ-epistemic model.
We have thus shown that one can exclude δ-continuous
separable models with δ ≥ δnd for any positive integers d
and n. For large n this bound behaves as δ & γ/n, with
γ = (d−1)[log(d−1)− log(d−2)]/(2d), thereby implying
by taking n arbitrarily large that no ψ-epistemic model
for Hilbert spaces of dimension d ≥ 3 can satisfy both
the assumptions of continuity and separability.
It is interesting to compare how these no-go theorems
could be used in practice to test ψ-epistemic models (see
[10, 21] for actual tests). Experimental tests that rule
out ψ-epistemic models for smaller values of the continu-
ity parameter δ are clearly stronger. We thus consider
how resources scales as δ → 0. If we use the construction
of Theorem 1, then we need to use systems of dimen-
sion d = O(1/(2δ)), and the resources needed to test
ψ-epistemic models increase as O(1/δ). If we use The-
orem 2, and take e.g. the dimension d = 3, then one
needs to prepare three states |φ⊗n1 〉, |φ⊗n2 〉, |φ⊗n3 〉, where
the number of copies of each state is n = O(ln 2/(3δ)).
Again the resources needed increase as O(1/δ). Finally,
we could also test δ-continuous ψ-epistemic models us-
ing the construction given in PBR [8]. In this case we
need to prepare 2n distinct states, each of which is a
product state of n qubits, with n = O(
√
2 ln 2/
√
δ). The
resources required for the application of the PBR con-
struction therefore grow exponentially in 1/
√
δ. Experi-
mental tests based on Theorems 1 and 2 thus seem much
easier than those based on the PBR construction.
Note that our theoretical arguments and PBR’s one
rely on the fact that certain quantum probabilities are
exactly equal to zero. However, these arguments are ro-
bust against small deviations from these predictions, as
expected in an experimental implementation where noise
is inevitably present. Indeed, Eq. (2) implies that the
observed value ǫexp =
∑
k P (k|M,Qk) provides an up-
per bound on the overlap ǫ =
∑
λmink P (λ|Qk) of the
ontic distributions P (λ|Qk). A small value of ǫexp there-
fore translates into a strong constraint on continuous ψ-
epistemic models, since it implies that these distributions
have only a small common overlap. Similarly ǫnexp =∑
k P (k|M,Qnk ) in Theorem 2 upper bounds the overlap
ǫn =
∑
~λmink P (
~λ|Qnk ) of the n-copy joint distributions
P (~λ|Qnk ). This last quantity can simply be related to the
single-copy overlap ǫ if we further make the preparation
independence assumption of PBR that joint distributions
P (~λ|Qnk ) = P (λ1, . . . λn|Qnk ) = P (λ1|Qk) . . . P (λn|Qk)
are product of individual distributions, which then im-
plies ǫn = ǫ
n. Note that a comparison of the sensitivity
of the different tests to experimental noise is possible,
but goes beyond the scope of the present work. It would
require a detailed modeling of the state preparation and
4measurement procedures.
Discussion. In his seminal paper on the probabilistic
interpretation of quantum theory, Born gave the wave-
function a functional interpretation: a mathematical ob-
ject from which the probabilities of different measure-
ment outcomes can be determined [22]. But the funda-
mental nature of this object, a real physical wave or a
summary of our knowledge about physical systems, is a
question that has divided physicists ever since. A pre-
cise formulation of these two alternatives, opening the
way to clear-cut answers, was provided by Harrigan and
Spekkens [6]. If the wavefunction corresponds to a real,
ontic, property of physical systems, the preparation of a
system in different pure quantum states should always re-
sult in different physical states. If, on the other hand, the
wavefunction has an epistemic status, such preparations
should sometimes result in the same underlying physi-
cal state. PBR have recently introduced a no-go theo-
rem that, given certain assumptions, rules out this latter
possibility [9], thus awarding ontic status to the wave-
function. This result can also be seen as a constraint on
the structure of possible extensions or generalizations of
quantum theory. If they reproduce the quantum predic-
tions and satisfy these assumptions, then such theories
can only supplement the wavefunction ψ with additional
variables λ′, i.e., a system should be described by a phys-
ical state of the form λ = (ψ, λ′).
The theorem of PBR relies on two main assumptions.
The first, which is also unquestioned in the present work,
is that a system has a real and objective state λ that is
independent of the observer. The second is an assump-
tion of “preparation independence”, which states that
independently prepared systems are described by inde-
pendent product distributions over real states. It can
be replaced by the weaker separability assumption used
here.
In the present work, we reached the same conclusion
as PBR using a simple argument that relies on a natu-
ral assumption of continuity. This notion of continuity
captures the intuition that in a model where the quan-
tum state is epistemic, a small variation of ψ does not
necessarily imply a variation of the underlying real state
λ. We derived a fundamental limit on the degree of
continuity of ψ-epistemic models, as parametrized by a
quantity δ, already at the level of single quantum sys-
tems (Theorem 1). Combining our continuity assumption
with a separability assumption, we then showed that no
ψ-epistemic model can reproduce all the predictions of
quantum theory (Theorem 2).
Besides their simplicity and the fact that they already
constrain ψ-epistemic models for single quantum sys-
tems, an interest of our results is that they are easy to im-
plement experimentally. Such an experimental test based
on Theorem 1 has been reported in [10].
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Appendix A: General formulation of the no-go
theorems in the context of measurable spaces
Here we formulate our main result in the context of
measurable spaces. Two main cases are of interest: when
the space of ontic states Λ is discrete, and when it is ab-
solutely continuous. The discrete case was treated in the
main text. It has the advantage of notational simplic-
ity, but is probably difficult to justify as it is known that
reproducing the predictions of quantum theory requires
that the space of ontic states Λ be continuous [18–20].
The absolutely continuous case is more natural, but the
notation and proofs are slightly more cumbersome. In
the following we first introduce a general measure theo-
retic framework for ontic states, and then restrict to the
absolutely continuous case.
The state space Λ is assumed to be a (probability)
measure space with a fixed σ-algebra Ω of events. We
assume the existence of a reference measure m on Λ. For
a measurable set A ⊂ Λ, m(A) = ∫ χAdm(λ), where χA
is the indicator function for A (1 on A and 0 elsewhere).
Each preparation Q induces a conditional probabil-
ity measure P (−|Q) defined on Ω. From the Lebesgue
decomposition theorem [23] we infer that the measure
P (−|Q) can be decomposed as
P (−|Q) = Ps(−|Q) + Pa(−|Q) ,
where the measures Ps(−|Q) and Pa(−|Q) are respec-
tively singular and absolutely continuous with respect to
m. Recall that a measure µ is concentrated on a set C
if for any measurable set B, µ(B) = µ(B ∩ C), and that
two measures are singular with respect to each other if
they are concentrated on disjoint sets. Furthermore the
singular part Ps(−|Q) can be decomposed into a discrete
singular part which consists of a sum of Dirac measures
(“δ functions”) and a singular continuous part.
In the remainder we consider the case where P (−|Q)
only consists of an absolutely continuous part. This is
the assumption that is generally made in the literature.
The case where there is only a discrete singular part was
discussed in the main text. Note that our results can
be extended to the case where either the absolutely con-
tinuous or the discrete singular part are non-zero. Our
results do not apply to the case where there is only a
singular continuous part.
We denote by Sm the set on which m is concentrated.
The fact that the measure P (−|Q) is absolutely continu-
ous with respect to m (P (A|Q) = 0 whenever m(A) = 0)
implies that there is anm-measurable function p(λ|Q) on
Λ such that for all A ∈ Ω
Pa(A|Q) =
∫
A
p(λ|Q)dm(λ) .
5In integration theory the function p(λ|Q) is called the
Radon-Nikodym derivative [23].
We further suppose that the probability of obtaining
result r given measurement M and ontic state λ is given
by an m-measurable function p(r|M,λ). Then we have
P (r|M,Q) =
∫
Λ
p(r|M,λ)p(λ|Q)dm(λ) . (A1)
We can define the support SupQ of the function p(λ|Q)
as the complement of the set on which it vanishes. Since
m(SupQ) = m(Sm ∩ SupQ) there will be no loss of gen-
erality if we restrict the support to Sm. (Note that if the
measure is not absolutely continuous, we cannot intro-
duce in general the concept of “support” of the measures
P (−|Q) as it requires a topology on Λ which we do not
assume).
Given the above framework, we now state and prove
the results presented in the main text in the case of abso-
lutely continuous measures. This includes the case where
Λ = Rn with m the standard measure on Rn.
Definition (ψ-epistemic model). A statistical model is
ψ-epistemic if there exist two preparation procedures Q1
and Q2 giving two distinct quantum states such that
m(SupQ1 ∩ SupQ2) > 0.
Definition (Continuity). A ψ-epistemic model is δ-
continuous if, given the preparation Q of the pure quan-
tum state ψQ, there is a set A
δ ∈ Λ (which can depend
on Q) such that for all states φ satisfying 1−|〈φ|ψ〉| ≤ δ,
Aδ ⊂ SupQφ and
∫
Aδ p(λ|Qφ)dm(λ) > 0. Note that this
implies that m(Aδ) > 0. A model is continuous, if it is
δ-continuous for some δ > 0.
Why is δ-continuity a “natural” condition? Informally
the reason is that –except in rare occasions– physical
quantities depend continuously on their parameters. Dis-
continuities are generally attributable to mathematical
idealisation. To illustrate this in the present case, sup-
pose that we can write Q = (Q′, ψQ), where ψQ is the
pure state produced by Q, and Q′ are additional vari-
ables specifying the preparation. Furthermore suppose
that λ,Q′, ψQ all belong to compact subsets of real eu-
clidean space Rn, and that the probability distribution
p(λ|Q′, ψQ) is a continuous function of all its parameters.
Then it is uniformly continuous, and hence δ−continuous
for some δ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let the dimension of the quan-
tum state space be d. We consider the same d inde-
pendent non-orthogonal states ψk =
1√
d−1
∑
j 6=k |j〉 as
in the main text. Suppose the model is δ-continuous for
δ ≥ 1−
√
(d− 1)/d. Then there exists a set Aδ ⊂ Supψk
for all k = 1, . . . , d with m(Aδ) > 0. Define a new func-
tion p˜(λ) = mink p(λ|ψk). Then we have
∑
k
p(k|ψk) =
∫
Λ
∑
k
p(k|λ)p(λ|ψk)dm(λ)
≥
∫
Aδ
∑
k
p(k|λ)p(λ|ψk)dm(λ)
≥
∫
Aδ
∑
k
p(k|λ)p˜(λ)dm(λ)
=
∫
Aδ
p˜(λ)dm(λ) . (A2)
It remains to show that
∫
Aδ
p˜(λ)dm(λ) is strictly posi-
tive. To this end we note that for each function p(λ|ψk)
there must be a positive integer Nk such that the set
TNk = {λ ∈ Aδ|p(λ|ψk) > 1/Nk} satisfies m(TNk) > 0.
Otherwise
∫
Aδ
p(λ|ψk)dm(λ) = 0, contrary to our hy-
pothesis. Let M = max{Nk}. Then for the set TM ≡
{λ ∈ Aδ|p˜(λ) > 1/M} we have TM ⊃ TNK for all k and
hence m(TM ) > 0. We conclude that
∫
Aδ
p˜(λ)dm(λ) ≥ 1
M
m(TM ) > 0 .
We thus arrive at the contradiction 0 =
∑
k p(k|ψk) >
0.
Definition (Separability.). Consider a preparation Q of
a physical system and any subset of ontic states A ∈ Λ
that occurs with non-zero probability P (A|Q) > 0. Con-
sider n identical copies of the preparation devices, which
when used yield preparation Qn = (Q, . . . , Q). Then the
product set An = A× . . .×A occurs with non-zero prob-
ability: P (An|Qn) > 0.
Note that according to this definition the space of ontic
states for n independent preparations may be larger than
the product Λ×. . .×Λ. This does not affect the definition
of separability.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 2 in the
case of absolutely continuous measures is a simple com-
bination of the arguments given in the main text in the
case of discrete singular measures, and the proof of Theo-
rem 1 for the case of absolutely continuous measures.
Appendix B: Relation between our continuity
assumption and ontic indifference
Hardy recently proposed a no-go theorem for ψ-
epistemic models for a single system that satisfies ontic
indifference, or restricted ontic indifference (see defini-
tions below) [14]. Here we show that ontic indifference
is an extremely strong condition for ψ-epistemic mod-
els, since it implies that there are ontic states λ that are
shared by all quantum states in the Hilbert space. It
6is therefore immediately in contradiction with the pre-
dictions of quantum theory since this implies that or-
thogonal quantum states have overlapping ontic distribu-
tions. Restricted ontic indifference does not suffer from
this problem, but on the other hand it breaks the uni-
tary invariance of Hilbert space by promoting one state
to a specific status. We show how the proof methods we
use to rule out δ-continuous ψ-epistemic models can be
easily transposed to provide no-go results for ψ-epistemic
models obeying restricted ontic indifference.
Definition (Ontic indifference [14]). Any quantum
transformation on a system which leaves unchanged any
given pure state, |ψ〉, can be performed in such a way that
it does not affect the underlying ontic states λ ∈ Λ|ψ〉 in
the ontic support of that pure state. By the ontic sup-
port of a given state, |ψ〉, one means the set Λ|ψ〉 of on-
tic states λ which might be prepared when the given pure
state is prepared.
Observation. Ontic indifference implies the following
fact: if two distinct states |ψ〉 6= |ψ′〉 share the same
ontic state λ, that is λ ∈ Λ|ψ〉 and λ ∈ Λ|ψ′〉, and if
U is a unitary transformation that leaves |ψ〉 invariant,
U |ψ〉 = |ψ〉, then λ ∈ ΛU|ψ′〉 belongs to the ontic support
of U |ψ′〉.
This follows from considering the following 4 prepara-
tions: a specific preparation P1 of |ψ〉, the preparation
P1 followed by unitary U (that leaves |ψ〉 invariant), a
specific preparation P2 of |ψ′〉, and the preparation P2
followed by unitary U (which prepares U |ψ′〉). Then
we note that preparation P1 sometimes yields the on-
tic state λ, that U leaves λ invariant, that preparation
P2 sometimes yields the ontic state λ, hence preparation
P2 followed by U sometimes yields the ontic state λ, and
therefore λ ∈ ΛU|ψ′〉.
This observation has the following consequence, which
implies directly that no ψ-epistemic model can reproduce
the predictions of quantum theory (since it implies in par-
ticular that orthogonal quantum states share a common
real state λ).
Theorem 3. If any two distinct states |ψ1〉 6= |ψ2〉 share
the same ontic state λ, that is λ ∈ Λ|ψ1〉 and λ ∈ Λ|ψ2〉,
and if ontic indifference holds, then all states in the
Hilbert space share the ontic state λ, that is λ ∈ Λ|ψ〉
for all |ψ〉.
Proof. To prove this consider the following sets Sk (k ≥
0) of states, where S0 = {|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉} and Sk = {|ψ〉 :
there exist |φ〉, |φ′〉 ∈ Sk−1 and a unitary U such that
U |φ〉 = |φ〉, U |φ′〉 = |ψ〉}. That is, Sk is the set of states
that can be obtained from Sk−1 by a unitary that leaves
one of the states in Sk−1 invariant.
By hypothesis, both states in S0 share the same on-
tic state λ. Hence by the above observation, all states
in Sk, for all k = 0, 1, 2, ..., also share the state λ. Now
consider the case of a 2-dimensional Hilbert space. If
|〈ψ1|ψ2〉| = cos θ are at an angle θ from each other (as
measured on the Bloch sphere), then it is easy to show
(just draw the successive sets Sk) that the size of Sk
increases exponentially, such that when k ≥ O(log θ),
Sk comprises the whole Bloch sphere. The case of a 2-
dimensional Hilbert space helps to visualize what is hap-
pening, but is not a restriction, since the linear span of
the set S1 is the whole Hilbert space.
We now show how a simple application of our results
provides a no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic models satisfy-
ing restricted ontic indifference.
Definition (Restricted ontic indifference [14]). Any
quantum transformation on a system which leaves un-
changed the pure state |ψ〉 can be performed in such a
way that it does not affect the underlying ontic states,
λ ∈ Λ|ψ〉, in the ontic support of that pure state.
Theorem 4. The quantum predictions are incompatible
with ψ-epistemic models satisfying the assumptions of re-
stricted ontic indifference and separability, and such that
there exists a state |ψ′〉 6= |ψ〉 sharing a common ontic
state λ with |ψ〉, where |ψ〉 is the particular state in the
definition of restricted ontic indifference.
Proof. Let d ≥ 2 be an integer such that |〈ψ′|ψ〉| ≤√
d−1
d . Add an ancilla |0〉 to the space such that the
dimension of the full Hilbert space is greater or equal
to d. By the assumption of separability the states
|Ψ〉 = |ψ〉|0〉 and |Ψ′〉 = |ψ′〉|0〉 share a common ontic
state λ. Choose a basis such that |Ψ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
i=1 |i〉,
and coefficients αi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , d such that α1 = 0,∑d
i=2 α
2
i = 1,
1√
d
∑d
i=2 αi = |〈Ψ′|Ψ〉| (this is always
possible since |〈Ψ′|Ψ〉| ≤
√
d−1
d ). Define the states
|Φk〉 =
∑d
i=1 αi−k|i〉. (Note that these states coincide
with the states Ψk used in the main text if αi =
1√
d−1 ,
i = 2, . . . , d). The Observation above implies that all
the states |Φk〉 share the ontic state λ, since |〈Φk|Ψ〉| =
|〈Ψ′|Ψ〉|. We then obtain a contradiction with the pre-
dictions of quantum theory exactly as in the proof of
Theorem 1 given in the main text.
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